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PRODUCTION CHAINS AND WORKPLACE LAW 
VIOLATIONS: THE CASE OF APPLE AND 
FOXCONN 
BY HILARY K. JOSEPHS† 
ABSTRACT 
For decades U.S. based multinational companies have outsourced production of 
goods to developing countries with low labor costs and weak implementation of 
protective legislation. The consumer electronics giant Apple is a prime example: it 
outsources virtually all of its manufacturing to companies such as Foxconn, a 
Taiwanese original equipment manufacturer, which employs over a million assembly 
line workers in China. In the last several years Foxconn's operations have been 
under scrutiny for violation of Chinese domestic employment law. This paper focuses 
on the problem of compulsory overtime, a violation of both Chinese law and 
international labor standards, and various measures brought to bear on the 
problem. The analysis concludes that no single instrumentality is likely to eliminate 
compulsory overtime, but that a combination of pressures—better enforcement of 
domestic law, reports by non-governmental organizations, oversight provided by 
corporate social responsibility programs, and consumer reaction—may ultimately 
prove effective. Ameliorating the working conditions for workers abroad may also 
inure to the benefit of American workers through the process of reverse diffusion of 
labor norms. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For the last three decades, the dominant voice in U.S. legal academic writing, and 
in the sphere of U.S. law-making itself, has lauded the superiority of free market 
capitalism, unfettered by government regulation. As evidence of this phenomenon, 
one might point to the frequency with which Ronald Coase’s “The Problem of Social 
                                                          
† Professor of Law & Dean's Distinguished Research Scholar of Asian Law Emerita, Syracuse 
University College of Law. A draft of this article was presented at the Seventh Annual Labor 
and Employment Law Colloquium, Sept. 15, 2012, Chicago, Illinois. Keith Hand provided 
helpful feedback. All errors and omissions are my own. 
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Cost” has been cited in law review articles, the most cited article, with over 5,000 
citations, according to one study.1 Regardless of how Coase’s article should be 
interpreted,2 it is utilized to lend credence to a human propensity for wealth 
accumulation over other values and efficiency concerns as the best principle for 
ordering society.3 Even with respect to public goods, government has proved itself so 
incompetent, corrupt, and wasteful that the responsibility for them should be 
devolved onto private entities.4 
During the same time period, the role of non-government organizations (NGOs) 
has gained importance both domestically and internationally. The term NGO 
originated with the UN Charter but since the 1940s has come to be variously 
defined.5 Nonetheless, NGOs tend to have certain characteristics in common: the are 
not formed by nation-states but rather at the initiative of private parties (individuals 
or groups), are independent of any particular government,6 and are dedicated to 
public concerns (poverty alleviation, environmental protection, human rights).7 Since 
                                                          
 1 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 
110 Mich. L. Rev. 1483, 1489 (2012). A search of the law review literature on Lexis yields 
only 288 hits for Karl/Marx/Capital and 384 for Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations does better, at over 1800, but still not close to Coase. 
 2 Coase himself complained about being misunderstood and his ideas used for purposes 
he did not intend. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 159 (1988)(“It is my 
view that the objections raised to the Coase Theorem...are invalid, unimportant, or 
irrelevant”). See also id. at 26-27. (“The concept of ‘externality’ has come to play a central 
role in welfare economics, with results which have been wholly unfortunate”). 
 3 Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 51, 58 (2012)(quoting Milton Friedman’s assertion 
that “the only responsibility of business is to maximize profits”). The pendulum of public 
opinion, as expressed in the most recent political elections, in the United States may be 
swinging back in the other direction in the wake of various financial scandals and the 2008 
global economic crisis, in other words, the reckless unchecked pursuit of individual profit 
damages aggregate welfare in the long run. Once avid supporters of the unregulated free 
market have repented. See, e.g., The Big Banker’s Change of Heart, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 
2012, at A22 (Sanford Weill). For a scholarly perspective on the drawbacks of reliance on 
private law solutions and the importance of public regulation, see Nicholas C. Howson, When 
“Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis and the 
Limits of Private Law, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44 (2009).  
 4  Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the 
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 137 
(2005). 
 5 Christine Bakker & Luisa Vierruci, Introduction: a normative or pragmatic definition of 
NGOs?, in NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 16-17 (Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy & Lisa Vierucci, eds., 2008) (“In practice, a wide range of organizations has evolved, 
their diversity stemming from the very absence of prior regulation”). 
 6 Servile NGOs—or GONGOs—are beyond the scope of this paper. See Olivier de 
Frouville, Domesticating Civil Society at the United Nations, in Dupuy & Vierruci, supra note 
5, at 71. 
 7 SERGEY RIPINSKY & PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, NGO INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 4-7 (2007). 
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World War II, the number of international NGOs has risen dramatically, as high as 
44,000 by one count in 1999.8 
Another approach which has emerged to fill the gap left by governmental failure 
is the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), whereby private companies 
invest in public goods provision and reduce the negative externalities of their 
operations below levels required by law.9  Obviously, CSR involves a departure from 
the neoclassical model, whereby the firm’s sole raison d’être is the generation of 
profits. The debate as to whether CSR should exist has shifted to why it exists and 
what effects it produces.10 
The puzzle examined here is why, despite investigations by NGOs and oversight 
supplied by CSR, the problem of compulsory overtime at Foxconn,11 a contract 
handset maker for Apple,12 persists.13 The issue is ripe for analysis because there are 
well-defined domestic legal standards for what constitutes “compulsory overtime,” 
respectable authority that “compulsory overtime” violates international law,14 and 
much information in the public domain which corroborates the existence of 
“compulsory overtime.”15  
                                                          
 8 Id. at 7. 
 9 Id. at 51. In this paper, I will use the term CSR to include compliance with legally 
mandated minimum requirements, not just “above the floor” commitments, which is the usual 
sense of the term. 
 10 Id. See also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 11-13, 97-103 (2010) (describing various CSR 
commitments). 
 11 Foxconn, also known as Hon Hai Precision Industry Company Ltd., is a Taiwanese 
company. See Hon Hai Precision Ind. Co. Ltd., FOXCONN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, 
http://www.fih-foxconn.com/about/HONHAIprofile.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 12 For a time the world’s most valuable company by stock valuation. See E.S. Browning et 
al, Apple Now Biggest-Ever Company, WALL ST. J. (Aug.21, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443855804577601773524745182.html.  
Although Apple is incorporated in and has its headquarters in the United States, virtually all 
Apple products are manufactured in Asia. See note 58, infra, and accompanying text. 
 13 For detailed discussion, see note 58, infra, and accompanying text. 
 14 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, ERADICATION OF FORCED LABOR, REPORT III 
(PART 1B) 12 (2007) (forced labor conventions most ratified of all ILO conventions); see also 
id. at 72 (compulsory overtime constitutes forced labor). In other situations, human rights 
advocates had to gain acceptance of a new international norm while proving that particular 
conduct violated it. See ANN MARIE CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 19 (2001). 
 15 On the advantages of limited focus, see ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL, THE GLOBAL 
WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
71 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the four fundamental human rights articulated in the 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work); Andrew Herman, Reassessing 
the Role of Supplier Codes of Conduct: Closing the Gap Between Aspirations and Reality, 52 
VA. J. INT’L L. 445, 471-81 (2012) (recommending focus on “living wage”). 
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It may be that in an authoritarian system such as China’s, which bans 
independent unions and constricts civil society,16 there is no effective substitute for 
government enforcement. And remedial government action will be more likely in 
response to “self-help” protests by affected workers.17 As for pressure from abroad, 
some consumer products may be impervious to adverse publicity and consumer 
boycotts, even among those consumers who consider themselves “socially 
conscious.”18  
No one instrumentality is likely to solve the problem, but a combination may 
produce—what will in hindsight be—significant change. On the other hand, where a 
number of modalities exist to rectify violations of worker rights, does their 
combination create a whole greater than the sum of its parts, or do they result in a 
dispersion of energy and resources which should be concentrated on one or a few 
modalities?19  
This article concludes that while NGO reports and CSR investigations are 
duplicative of one another, and in that sense redundant and “inefficient,” there is no 
viable alternative to publicizing workplace violations and garnering public support, 
inside China and abroad, for their remediation. A multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder 
approach is especially necessary in a society where channels of information are 
heavily monitored and censored by the government. The discussion which follows 
will examine the various instrumentalities of reform and assess their respective 
strengths and weaknesses. 
II. PRC WORKPLACE LAW 
Since Foxconn’s manufacturing operations are located in China, it is the law of 
the forum to which we must turn first. The worker’s right to rest is a basic right set 
forth in art. 43 of the PRC Constitution. Under PRC law constitutional rights are not 
directly justiciable, but the right to rest is expressed in positive law, namely the 1994 
Labor Law. As described by a noted academic commentary, “the goal of the Labor 
Law is to protect workers’ health by prescribing hours of rest. After a day of 
exhausting work, a worker is spent both physically and mentally. Only through rest 
can s/he recover strength,  maintain a healthy body, and replenish energy, so that 
s/he can further engage in production, achieve advances in professional education, 
                                                          
 16 See generally Jillian S. Ashley & Pengyu He, Opening One Eye and Closing the Other: 
The Legal and Regulatory Environment for “Grassroots” NGOs in China Today, 26 B.U. 
INT’L L. J. 29 (2008).  
 17 See generally Yang Su & Xin He, Street as Courtroom: State Accommodation of Labor 
Protest in South China, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 157 (2010) (discussing proactive, extrajudicial 
dispute resolution by government agencies and the courts). 
 18 Because the focus of this article is workplace violations, specifically those dealing with 
overtime demands, it will not address in depth consumer boycotts responding to other 
situations of corporate misconduct, such as environmental degradation. 
 19 In an article about threats by “green” organizations to boycott “brown” producers, the 
diffusion problem is articulated as follows: “[T]here may be competing public interest 
organisations that represent ‘non-environmentalist’ consumers and counter the [green 
organisation]’s efforts. There may be different [green organisations]–with different objective 
functions–competing to represent consumers.” Robert Innes, A Theory of Consumer Boycotts 
Under Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition, 116 ECON. J. 355, 376 (2006). 
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participate in social activities and household chores, and arrange his/her personal 
life.”20 
The Labor Law, as amended by a 1995 State Council regulation, provides in 
pertinent part for a standard 40 hour work week with a minimum of one rest day per 
calendar week.21 Under standard arrangements, the employer must obtain the 
employee’s consent to any additional working hours,22 which must then be 
compensated at overtime rates.23 However, overtime is limited to three hours per day 
or thirty six hours in a single month.24 Failure to properly compensate overtime 
subjects the employer to fines.25 
However, the Labor Law does legitimate alternative arrangements which are not 
subject to overtime requirements.26 The alternative arrangement theoretically 
applicable to factory workers, the Comprehensive Working Hours System, 
authorizes a longer work day during peak periods so long as total hours worked 
during a particular cycle do not exceed the limit on total hours during that period.27 
Such a system requires permission from the local labor authorities and consultation 
with the enterprise trade union and the workforce.28 The spirit of the exception is to 
make a reasonable accommodation for industries which are genuinely seasonal, such 
as food processing, but the very existence of an exception tempts employer abuse. 
Forced labor is not only an issue of employment law but also of the criminal law. 
Violations are punishable by a fixed term of imprisonment and a fine, up to ten years 
if the violation is particularly serious.29 This provision of the criminal law broadly 
applies to forced labor generally, and not just forced overtime. 
                                                          
 20 A COMPLETE COMMENTARY ON THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT LAW 106-107 (Li Jianfei 
ed. 2008). 
 21 Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., 
July 5, 1994, effective May 1, 1995) at art. 36, 38 [hereinafter Labor Law].  For adoption of 
the 40-hour work week, see China – Working time – 2011, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/travmain.sectionReport1?p_lang=en&p_structure=2&p_year=2
011&p_start=1&p_increment=10&p_sc_id=1001&p_countries=NE&p_countries=CN&p_pri
nt=Y 
 22 Labor Law at art. 41. Workers may not be compelled to work overtime. Labor Contract 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 
2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) at art. 31 [hereinafter Employment Contract Law]. 
 23 Labor Law, supra note 21, at art. 44. 
 24 Id. at art. 41.  
 25 Employment Contract Law, supra note 22, at art. 85. 
 26 Labor Law, supra note 21, at art. 39. 
 27 ANDREAS LAUFFS, EMPLOYMENT LAW & PRACTICE IN CHINA 106 (2008). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Nat'l People's 
Cong., July 6, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980, as amended) at art. 244 [hereinafter Criminal 
Law]. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON “FORCED LABOR” 
The ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
which binds all members of the ILO, targets four areas of concern, including the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor. This objective is undergirded 
by two ILO Conventions, Convention No. 29 (Forced Labour, 1930) and Convention 
No. 105 (Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957).30 Convention No. 29 provides in 
pertinent part that “the term forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work or 
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for 
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” Convention 105 provides 
in pertinent part that forced or compulsory labor cannot be used as a method of 
mobilising and using labour for purposes of economic development.31 
The concept of forced labor is interpreted to comprise three elements: (1) work or 
service provided by an individual to a third party; (2) work performed under threat of 
penalty, which can be physical, psychological, financial, or other form of 
intimidation; (3) involuntariness, including situations where, although the work may 
initially have been undertaken voluntarily, the worker cannot leave (a) with a 
reasonable period of notice or (b) without forgoing payment or other entitlement.32 
The ILO considers obligations to work overtime to earn the legally mandated 
minimum wage or to avoid dismissal “threat of penalty.”33 Coercion may be applied 
in overt ways, such as the use of guards or locking the premises to prevent workers 
from leaving, or more indirectly, such as taking possession of identity papers.34 
IV. REPORTS OF COMPULSORY OVERTIME AT FOXCONN 
As part of a new approach to economic development and foreign investment, 
China established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1979.35 The problem of 
                                                          
 30 China is not party to either Convention No. 29 or Convention No. 105, but as a member 
of the ILO, it is bound by the Declaration, which requires non-ratifying states to submit 
reports on their progress towards achieving core labor standards. BLANPAIN, supra note 15, at 
76. China has complied with this requirement. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, supra 
note 14, at 14. The U.S. is party to Convention 105 but not Convention 29. Id. 
 31 BLANPAIN, supra note 15, at 103-09 (report of ILO commission of inquiry into forced 
labor in Myanmar). 
 32 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, ILO GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOUR: RESULTS 
AND METHODOLOGY 19 (2012), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—
ed_norm/—declaration/documents/publication/wcms_182004.pdf. Cf. E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.17 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing economic duress). 
 33 See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, supra note 14, at 72. 
 34 Id. See Employment Contract Law, supra note 22, at art. 84 (penalty for retaining 
worker’s ID card); Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security, 
Regulations on Standards for Prosecuting Cases under the Criminal Law (No. 1) [Zuigao 
renmin jianchayuan, gong’an bu guanyu gong’an jiguan guanxia de xingshi anjian li’an zhuisu 
biaozhun de guiding (yi)], at art . 31 (2) (defining compulsion to include withholding wages 
and retaining IDs). Because of China’s system of restrictions on internal migration, possession 
of the ID is an effective deterrent to quits. See Hilary K. Josephs, Residence and Nationality 
as Determinants of Status in Modern China, 46 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 295 (2011). 
 35 For discussion of the policy spurring establishment of SEZs, see BLANPAIN, supra note 
15, at 764-65. Three out of four of the early SEZs at this time were located in Guangdong 
Province; the fourth was located in adjoining Fujian Province. 
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compulsory overtime was anticipated from the beginning. Regulation of standard 
working hours and overtime was addressed in Guangdong Province’s Interim 
Provisions for Labor and Wage Management art. 10, which provided for six work 
days per week, eight hours per day.36 However, enforcement lagged seriously behind 
the written law, and systematic violation has been reported continuously for the last 
three decades.37 
In 2006 China Business News (Di Yi Caijing Ribao) and Britain’s Sunday Mail  
published exposés of working conditions, including compulsory overtime, at the 
Foxconn facility in the Shenzhen SEZ.38 Additional domestic and international 
publicity accompanied a number of employee suicides in 2010.39 In 2011-12 several 
NGOs published reports substantiating complaints about compulsory overtime.40 The 
Apple Supplier Responsibility 2012 Progress  
Report,41 though not identifying Foxconn specifically in this connection, stated 
that its audits of suppliers showed a compliance rate of only 38 percent for working 
                                                          
 36 Interim Provisions for Labor and Wage Management in Enterprises in the Special 
Economic Zones in Guangdong Province (promulgated by the 13th Session of the Standing 
Committee of the Fifth People’s Cong. of Guangdong Province, Dec. 24, 1981, effective Jan. 
1, 1982) at art. 10, available at http://www.novexcn.com/lab_wage_man_ gundong.html (last 
visitedAug. 9, 2012). 
 37 At an interview conducted at the Shekou Industrial District Labor Service Company in 
June 1986, officials reported that excessive overtime was a major problem at the San’yo 
Electronics plant. Workers regularly put in 12hour days (Shekou was a separately 
administered area within the Shenzhen SEZ). See HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA: 
CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY 89 (1990). 
 38 Raymond Li, iPod Maker Sues Over Labour Story, S. CHINA MORNING POST, (July 19, 
2012), http://www.scmp.com/article/561980/ipod-maker-sues-over-labour-story; The Stark 
Reality of iPod’s Chinese Factories, MAIL ON SUNDAY, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
news/article-401234/The-stark-reality-iPods-Chinese-factories.html (last updated Aug. 18, 
2006) (quoting one worker as saying “[w]e have to work overtime if we are told to and can 
only go back to the dormitories when our boss gives us permission”). 
 39 Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China Suicides: Is Apple Headed for a Consumer Backlash?, 
GLOBALPOST (May 28, 2010), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/Apple-iPad-suicides-
china-suppliers. 
 40 See, e.g., Foxconn and Apple Fail to Fulfill Promises: Predicaments of Workers after 
the Suicides, STUDENTS & SCHOLARS AGAINST CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOUR (SACOM) (May 7, 
2011), http://sacom.hk/archives/837; CHINA LABOR WATCH, TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: 
THE TRUTH BEHIND ELECTRONIC SWEATSHOPS (2012), available at 
http://chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/20110712.pdf [hereinafter CLW Report]; VERITÉ, FOR 
WORKERS’ BENEFIT: SOLVING OVERTIME PROBLEMS IN CHINESE FACTORIES (2012), available 
at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/globaldocs/1593/. The CLW Report concludes that 
“the failings of Foxconn exist in the majority of electronics factories, and are representative of 
the policies and behavioral norms found throughout the electronics industry.” CLW Report at 
12. None of 16 mobile phone companies rated very well in the area of workers’ rights. 
Motorola ranked highest at 23 out of 100; Apple was second at 21. Free Buyers’ Guide to 
Mobile Handsets, ETHICAL CONSUMER, 
http://www.ethicalconsumer.org/buyersguides/phonebroadband/mobilephones.aspx (last 
visited March 7, 2013). 
 41 APPLE, APPLE SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITY 2012 PROGRESS REPORT 7 (2012), available at 
http://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/Apple_SR_2012_Progress_Report.pdf.  
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hours.42 Of the seven criteria applied in the area of labor and human rights, this 
measure was by far the lowest; the next lowest was wages and benefits at 69 
percent.43  
V.  THE ROLE OF NGOS: INFORMATION AND ACTION? 
NGOs may play a variety of roles in the enforcement of international human 
rights, creating and mobilizing networks of committed persons, gathering 
information at the grass roots, and proposing action strategies for national 
governments and international organizations.44 Arguably the most important 
contribution of NGOs is fact-finding.45 Generally NGOs have developed a track 
record of accuracy, independence, and impartiality.46 In their information-gathering 
capacity, NGOs can deploy “undercover” methods of investigation, foreclosed to 
agents of national governments, international missions, and social compliance 
monitors formally dispatched by MNCs.47 However, with the proliferation of NGOs, 
the question of “effectiveness” in a world of perpetually limited resources comes 
into play. As with CSR programs discussed below, an NGO may be well-managed 
internally without necessarily producing desired outcomes.48 
                                                          
 42 This percentage represented a decline in compliance from the preceding year. Paul 
Harris, Apple Hit by Boycott Call Over Worker Abuses in China,  THE OBSERVER, (Jan. 28, 
2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/29/apple-faces-boycott-
worker-abuses. Apple’s Code sets a maximum of 60 work hours per week and requires at least 
one day of rest per seven days of work, absent “unusual” or “exceptional” circumstances. 
Under Chinese law,  the standard maximum should be 49 hours (40 plus 9). A Fair Labor 
Association (FLA) report, Independent Investigation of Apple Supplier, Foxconn, identified 
violations of overtime limits per FLA’s Workplace Code of Conduct and Chinese law but did 
not find any problem of “forced labor.” FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION, INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATION OF APPLE SUPPLIER, FOXCONN 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/foxconn_ 
investigation_report_0.pdf [hereinafter FLA Report]. 
 43 Id. at 7. 
 44  RIPINSKY & VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 7, at 9. 
 45 See CLARK, supra note 14, at 16, 32-33, 104, 129-30. 
 46 See id. 
 47  Thomas Fuller, ‘Sweatshop Snoops’ Take on China Factories, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/15/world/asia/15iht-inspect.2827852.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0; CLW Report, supra note 40, at 7 (CLW staff gained entry to a plant 
by being hired as workers); cf. Dexter Roberts & Pete Engardio, Secrets, Lies, and 
Sweatshops, BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-11-
26/secrets-lies-and-sweatshops (factories keep two sets of books and coach workers on how to 
answer questions from compliance monitors). 
 48 See generally Jesse D. Lecy et al., Non-Governmental and Not-for-Profit 
Organizational Effectiveness: A Structured Literature Review, 23 INT’L J. VOLUNTARY & 
NONPROFIT ORG. 434 (2012) (empirical studies of “effectiveness” rare and no consensus as to 
how “effectiveness” should be measured).  George Edwards judges NGO effectiveness by 
results, but results are broadly defined to include human rights education. George Edwards, 
Ten Attributes of Highly Successful Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations, 18 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 211 (2010). For an attempt at NGO self-governance, see NGO CODE 
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In cases such as labor abuses in China’s SEZs, many separate NGOs have been 
reporting to the same effect for a number of years. The relative trustworthiness of 
any particular NGO and its publications may be judged according to various criteria: 
(1) the nationality, education, and work experience of the NGO’s  principals;49 (2) 
the background and qualifications of its investigative staff; (3) the duration of the 
investigations which provide factual support for its publications; (4) the sample size; 
(5) the extent to which a report is annotated or its conclusions supported by 
numerical data; (6) sources of funding for its activities, as a possible indicator of 
bias;50 (7) accreditation with an international organization, such as the ILO;51 (8) 
whether, and to what extent, a report is cited in government publications, media and 
the scholarly literature;52 (9) whether the NGO maintains a bilingual website 
apprising affected workers of their rights and efforts made to effectuate them.53 
While no single NGO meets each and every one of the above criteria, CLW certainly 
satisfies some, most importantly, executive leadership by a native Chinese, 
production of extended, detailed reports on factory conditions based on first-hand 
observation, and media coverage in newspapers of international reputation such as 
The New York Times and the Financial Times (London). 
                                                          
OF CONDUCT FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS STRENGTHENING, http://ngocodeofconduct.org (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2013). 
 49 Li Qiang, a Chinese, is the principal of CLW, which is based in New York. Our People, 
CHINA LABOR WATCH, http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/OurPeople.html (last visited Mar. 8, 
2013). 
 50 CLW has received  financing from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a 
private, nonprofit foundation, which in turn is funded largely by the U.S. Congress. In 
addition to CLW, NED has provided grants to other organizations tasked with promoting 
labor rights enforcement in China, such as the American Center for International Labor 
Solidarity and Human Rights in China. See About NED, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR 
DEMOCRACY, http://www.ned.org/about (last visited July 11, 2012); Where We Work, 
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, http://www.ned.org/where-we-work (last visited 
July 11, 2012). 
 51 RIPINSKY & VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 7, at 72-73. If an NGO receives an invitation 
from the ILO, it may attend and participate in meetings in the same manner as those 
international and regional organizations which have permanent consultative status (the 
“Special List”). As of August 2012, SACOM, CLW, and Verité were not on the Special List. 
See ILO Special List of NGOs, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/pardev/civil-society/ngos/ilo-special-list-of-ngos/lang--en/index.htm (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2012).  Neither CLW nor Verité were evaluated by charitynavigator.com, 
which rates the financial health and accountability and transparency of §503(c)(3) 
organizations based in the United States. See generally CHARITY NAVIGATOR, 
http://www.charitynavigator.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 52 The 2011 report of the U.S. Congressional-Executive Committee on China (CECC), 
cites to China Labour Bulletin, China Labor News Translations, the International Trade Union 
Confederation, the Shenzhen Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Centre, the Institute for the Study of 
Labor (IZA), Human Rights Watch, and the ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application and Recommendations, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. See generally 
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 53 China Labour Bulletin and Human Rights in China are among those with bilingual 
websites. See generally CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, http://www.clb.org.hk/en/ (last visited Mar. 
8, 2013); HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, http://www.hrichina.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
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It is not uncommon for a report to contain a list of recommendations for action. 
The CLW Report made the following recommendations, among others: (1) creation 
by the UN and the ILO of a special set of labor standards for the electronics 
industry;54 (2) pressure on the Chinese government to realize genuine worker 
representation;55 (3) encouragement of ethical purchasing;56 (4) fair trade labeling, so 
as to identify supplier factories;57 (5) worker hotlines for making complaints 
internally;58 (6) training programs for managers of supplier factories.59  
CLW does not recommend a boycott, but rather a “buycott” through ethical 
purchasing; fair trade labeling in turn enables ethical consumer decision-making.60 
The recommendations reflect a perspective that various actors have a role to play and 
their combined efforts are necessary to produce a positive outcome.61  However, 
implementation of these recommendations lies outside the power of the NGO itself.  
VI. THE “EFFECTIVENESS” OF CSR 
When the nation-state is unable or unwilling to enforce its own written law, CSR 
has been proposed as one of a number of  next-best alternatives.62 With the rise of 
outsourcing by “virtual” corporations in developed countries,63 the development of 
                                                          
 54 CLW Report, supra note 40, at 9. The ILO has issued a number of conventions 
protective of certain occupations such as seafarers, miners, and agricultural workers. See 
Subjects Covered by International Labour Standards, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-
standards/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 55 Doubtful where there is only a single official trade union with a dismal record of 
protecting worker rights. BLANPAIN, supra note 15, at 749-52. 
 56 CLW Report, supra note 40, at 9. 
 57 Id. 
 58 CLW Report, supra note 40, at 10. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE 
MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 201 (1999). 
 61 See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, supra note 14, at 1. (discussing the 
“multistakeholder global alliance” approach). 
 62 See BLANPAIN, supra note 15, at 847-48 (discussing, inter alia, complaints brought 
under the auspices of the ILO, regional trade agreements such as NAALC, and the OECD). 
Efforts to enforce foreign workplace law in U.S. courts has been largely unsuccessful. Id. The 
president rejected a petition under § 301 to sanction China for labor rights violations. See 
MARK BARENBERG, SUSTAINING WORKERS’ BARGAINING POWER IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 12, 53 (2009), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/bp246. 
 63 Substantially all of Apple’s products are manufactured in Asia by “outsourcing 
partners,” mainly Foxconn and Quanta. APPLE, FORM 10-K ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2010) 
available at http://investor.apple.com/sec.cfm. Apple’s nearly exclusive relationship with 
these companies make it less willing to exert pressure on them to improve working conditions. 
See Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, the Human Costs That are Built Into an 
iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, at A1 (quoting former Apple executives as saying that 
terminating Foxconn and finding alternative suppliers would be time-consuming and costly). 
The obvious counterargument is that dependence runs in both directions and furthermore, it is 
easier to monitor and exert pressure on a few suppliers with large workforces than many small 
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production chains through subcontracting arrangements, and the globalization of the 
production process, pressure may be more effectively applied to the multinational 
enterprises which market final products rather than to the governments where 
subcontracting occurs. While under no legal obligation for the actions and omissions 
of foreign subcontractors,64 multinational enterprises do have a stake in their 
reputations and brand equity.65  
However, there is little empirical evidence that CSR has been a more effective 
enforcement tool than the domestic legal system of the country where production 
takes place.66 When an MNC delegates the responsibility for monitoring to a third 
party auditor, so as to avoid the appearance of bias, the auditor’s own credibility may 
be called into question if it in turn subcontracts its duties to other parties. The 
auditor’s final report is only as reliable as those of its subcontractors. The FLA’s 
“independent” investigation of Foxconn was implemented by three “FLA-
accredited” monitors:67 Openview,68 Social Compliances Services Asia (SCSA),69 
and INFACT.70 No matter how capable and experienced their staff may be, no matter 
                                                          
players.  See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law? Accounting 
for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 201, 210 (2011). 
 64 Companies in the United States which subcontract domestically have been held liable 
for the conduct of their subcontractors. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and 
Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland 
Between an Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 639-41 (2012). If 
Apple’s products were manufactured in the United States, it could be liable for wage and hour 
violations of its subcontractors under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Brishen Rogers, 
Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9-11 (2010). 
Apple is intimately informed about the operations of its subcontractors and has been 
conducting audits of their operations since 2007. Moreover, Apple’s unreasonable delivery 
lead times is a direct cause of overtime demands. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 63.. Cf. 
ESTLUND, supra note 10, at 99 (discussing Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 
2007); no duty under either contract or tort law towards workers of foreign suppliers). 
 65 BLANPAIN, supra note 15, at 848. 
 66 Cynthia Estlund, Enforcement of Private Transnational Labor Regulation: A New 
Frontier in the Anti-Sweatshop Movement?, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL 
REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD 237, 244-45 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 
2012). Estlund defines enforcement as “[a]t a minimum...some process of identifying 
violations (of a labor code) that can, failing correction, leads to sanctions against the violator.”  
Id. at 248. This definition includes both judicial (litigation culminating in an award of 
damages) and non-judicial enforcement (termination of a contractual relationship). Id. In one 
respect judicial enforcement is preferable because the results are made public, while 
termination of a supplier for workplace violations is confidential information. 
 67 FLA Report, supra note 42, at 4-6. 
 68 OPENVIEW SERVICE LIMITED, http://www.Openview.hk (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 69 SOCIAL COMPLIANCE SERVICE ASIA LIMITED, http://www.scsagroup.com (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2013). 
 70 INFACT SOCIAL PERFORMANCE SOLUTIONS, http://infactory-solutions.com (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2013). 
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how solid their empirical analysis by industry standards,71 they are servants to their 
ultimate employer and their reports are not available in the public domain.   
Furthermore, there is always a risk that private CSR will adversely affect local 
regulatory capacity. Already, developing countries may be even less inclined to 
dedicate public resources to regulation72 or “pass off” the responsibility for socio-
economic problems to NGOs. This is a “slippery slope” dilemma in the case of 
“failed states” where responsibility for education, health, and crisis management 
have devolved more or less permanently onto NGOs.73 While China in no way 
approaches the definition of a “failed” state, it is possible that the Communist Party 
sees civil society organizations as an easily controlled channel for the direction of 
energy which would otherwise go towards the introduction of multi-party 
democracy.74  
VII. CONSUMER WILLINGNESS TO BOYCOTT GOODS PRODUCED IN VIOLATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
After a spate of news articles about Foxconn’s operations appeared in the English 
language press, calls for a consumer boycott75 of Apple products emerged, and then, 
as often happens, petered out.76 There are instances where consumer boycotts have 
succeeded in changing corporate behavior, because reputation is part and parcel of a 
firm’s value and consumers’ willingness to purchase its goods and services.77 The 
next section explores why some consumer boycotts have a meaningful effect on 
                                                          
 71 See discussion of measuring NGO effectiveness, supra note 48, and accompanying text. 
 72 Estlund, supra note 66, at 249. 
 73 MADELEINE KRISTOFF & LIZ PANARELLI, HAITI: A REPUBLIC OF NGOS? (2010), 
available at http://www.usip.org/publications/haiti-republic-ngos; Dickinson, supra note 4, at 
138, and accompanying text; cf. ESTLUND, supra note 10, at 101 (CSR programs may “crowd 
out” worker organizations and local regulators); NGO CODE OF CONDUCT FOR HEALTH 
SYSTEMS STRENGTHENING, supra note 48 (“NGOs, if not careful and vigilant, can undermine 
the public sector and even the health system as a whole”). 
 74 See generally Ashley & He, supra note 16. 
 75 To specialists boycotts are not all of a piece. An instrumental boycott has a defined 
practical goal, while an expressive boycott is an outlet for frustration and anger, a self-
affirming opportunity to do something rather than sit by passively. FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, 
at 12-13, 133. However, one type of boycott may evolve into another. 
 76 See Harris, supra note 42); Brishen Rogers, How and Why to Boycott Apple, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2012/02/how-and-why-to-boycott-apple.html; Aaron Kwittken, Have Apple and 
Walmart Proven That Brands Can Be Invincible?, FORBES (June 1, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2012/05/02/have-apple-and-walmart-proven-that-
brands-can-be-invincible/ (“major corporations seem increasingly immune to damaging news, 
quickly bouncing back from corporate debacles with shockingly little long-term damage to 
their brand and the bottom line”). 
 77 Mark Hunter et al, Beyond Control: Crisis Strategies and Stakeholder Media in the 
Danone Boycott of 2001 (Insead Working Paper Series, Paper No. 5, 2008), ;  Karen 
Braunsberger & Brian Buckler, Consumers on a Mission to Force a Change in Public Policy: 
A Qualitative Study of the Ongoing Canadian Seafood Boycott, 114 BUS. & SOC. R. 457 
(2009); Rogers, Third-Party Liability, supra note 64, at 62, and sources cited therein. 
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corporate practices, not mere “window-dressing,” and why others do not even gain 
traction with the consuming public. 
Apple products occupy an intermediate position between necessities and luxury 
goods.78 While it does not enjoy a world monopoly with respect to any of its 
products, the Apple brand enjoys special cachet, for example, with respect to 
iPhones.79 Each succeeding generation of iPhone is designed for planned 
obsolescence and builds on the consumer loyalty developed with regard to earlier 
generations.80 A thorough-going, extended boycott of Apple products demands that a 
large number of people refrain from purchasing or using possessions they have 
already acquired, a considerable degree of sacrifice.81 Consumer boycotts are more 
likely to succeed when the product has a high degree of substitutability, making 
demand fairly elastic.82 
Furthermore, consumers tend to participate in a boycott when they believe their 
actions will have an impact on corporate behavior.  The smartphone potentially 
enhances this sense of participation because world-wide boycotts can be organized 
electronically.83 At the same time, joining a boycott electronically and anonymously 
is so easy that serious and sustained commitment to the purpose of the boycott may 
be lacking. An electronic boycott also runs the risk of bystander effect: As the 
number of participants increases, the sense of individual responsibility decreases.84  
                                                          
 78 Rogers, supra note 76 (terming Apple products luxury goods). Some uses of a product 
verge on necessity, as when a person is completely dependent on an iPhone for connectivity. 
Other uses may be classified as discretionary, such as using an iPhone to play video games (no 
offense to anyone intended.) 
 79 FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 219 (difficulty in mounting boycott when products have 
acquired strong consumer loyalty). See Apple in China: iPhone Make Chinese Eyes Light Up, 
THE ECONOMIST (July 28, 2012),  http://www.economist.com/node/21559624 (greater China, 
including Hong Kong and Taiwan, second largest market for Apple products). If Chinese 
consumers are themselves indifferent to the plight of workers, it is harder to make the case for 
the ethical responsibility of foreign consumers. 
 80 Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-and-a-squeezed-
middle-class.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (Apple released five iPhones in four years); Al 
Fasoldt, Google, Apple Take Very Different Approaches, POST-STANDARD, Sept. 9, 2012, at 
D2 (“[Apple’s] iOS is a buttoned-up operating system. You work with your iPhone or iPad the 
way Apple intended you to, and that’s that”). 
 81 Braunsberger & Buckler, supra note 72, at 469. 
 82 Id. at 471. 
 83 Rogers, supra note 76. 
 84 John M. Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of 
Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968); BARENBERG, supra note 62, at 
52. California’s “brother’s keeper” law, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810 (2013), was enacted during a 
series of campaigns by affected workers in that state.  See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave 
Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y. L. 
SCH. L. REV. 465, 505-07 (2005).The reluctance of U.S. courts to extend jurisdiction overseas, 
whether applying common law principles or statutes which are silent on extraterritoriality, 
makes good intuitive sense in line with individual behavior. It is only “natural” to care more 
about those “close” to us. Legal principle is aligned with human nature. To paraphrase Justice 
Cardozo, a sense of obligation is a function of physical proximity. See Palsgraf v. Long Island 
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Since the entire electronics industry has a reputation for worker abuse, 
consumers may not feel that switching to another product will make much of a 
difference on the factory floor.85  When a Chinese version of a New York Times 
article on Foxconn was posted to websites in China, one person commented: “If not 
to buy Apple, what’s the substitute–Samsung? Don’t you know that Samsung’s 
products are from its OEM factory in Tianjin? Samsung workers’ income and 
benefits are even worse than those at Foxconn.”86 
Labor used in the assembly process accounts for an insignificant portion of 
production costs.87 On the one hand, this fact may enhance consumer willingness to 
pay more for the product.88 On the other hand, it is difficult to ensure that an 
incremental increase in retail price will be passed along to the worker. OEM 
manufacturers such as Foxconn operate on very thin profit margins, which drives the 
tendency to exploit their workforces.89 The surplus created by an increase in the 
retail price may readily be appropriated by the manufacturer, if not by the retailer. 
The downturn in the economies of developed countries decreases empathy for 
others, even fellow citizens,90 much less foreign workers.91 Those who are 
                                                          
R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 343, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (“the orbit of the danger as disclosed to 
the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty”). 
 85 David Barboza, Questions for Li Qiang of China Labor Watch, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS, THE 
LEDE, (Jan. 26, 2012), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/q-and-a-with-li-qiang-of-
china-labor-watch/. 
 86 Chinese Readers on the ‘iEconomy,’ N.Y. TIMES BLOGS, THE LEDE, (Jan. 25, 2012). 
Samsung offers competing products at much lower prices. Tim Bradshaw, Apple Hits Sour 
Note in Emerging Markets, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at 18. CLW found the same kinds of 
workplace violations, including excessive overtime, at factories owned and managed by 
Samsung or which supply Samsung. CHINA LABOR WATCH, AN INVESTIGATION OF EIGHT 
SAMSUNG FACTORIES IN CHINA: IS SAMSUNG INFRINGING UPON APPLE’S PATENT TO BULLY 
WORKERS? (2012), available at 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/pdf/Samsung%20Report%200904-v.3.pdf. 
 87 Duhigg & Bradsher, supra note 80; (total cost of producing phone $196, of which 
assembly labor accounts for $8). This report does not break down the labor costs of producing 
the various components of the iPhone or delve into working conditions at components 
suppliers. 
 88 Id. (paying U.S. wages would add up to $65 to each iPhone’s expense). If a purchaser 
receives an iPhone as part of a “bundled” package for connectivity services, he is likely to pay 
a heavily discounted price for the phone itself.  Arik Hesseldahl, New iPhone 4S Cracked 
Open, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2011, at B5 (carriers cover part of sales price of phone if buyers 
sign up for two year service plan); Miriam Gottfreid, Bruised Mobile Carriers Fight Back at 
Apple, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2012, at C8 (Apple charges about $620 for each iPhone; mobile 
carriers have to offer subsidy of about $420). It would be necessary to parse the cost of the 
“bundle” for purposes of determining how much more the consumer would be willing to pay 
for the phone. “Bundling” locks consumers into a long-term relationship with the service 
provider, further discouraging ethical decision-making. 
 89 Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 63. 
 90 See comments posted for David Segal, Apple’s Retail Army, Long on Loyalty but Short 
on Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, at A1.  
 91 The popular image of China as a cruel despotic country with a passive, automaton-like 
population makes identification with the plight of exploited  foreign workers even more 
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unemployed or underemployed resent, rightfully or wrongfully, workers in 
developing countries who are perceived to have “stolen” their jobs.92 Those who are 
employed but expected to be available for work around the clock via smartphone do 
not see much difference between their plight and that of workers abroad.93 
VIII.  SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
The rise of China as the world’s manufacturing floor is so recent a phenomenon 
that it can only be expected that the combined forces of written law, NGO activity, 
and CSR programs would take time to produce a positive effect on working 
conditions. Meanwhile, changes in demographics and technology are likely to alter 
the situation for the better, at least as far as workers in SEZ plants are concerned.94 
Because of the one-child policy, the population of rural youth is in decline; fewer 
people are willing to undertake assembly line work far from home even if it is 
comparatively well paid.  
Hence, Foxconn is moving its operations inland closer to its supplies of labor, 
locations where the cost of living and hence wages are lower as compared with the 
SEZs.95 However, moving inland does not insulate Foxconn’s operations from 
scrutiny, and incidents of worker unrest are being reported at its factories in 
Zhengzhou, Taiyuan, Chengdu and Wuhan.96  
No matter how well-paid, the tedium of assembly line work is basically 
intolerable for a younger generation, better educated than its predecessors and 
seeking upward mobility.97 In recognition of this reality, Foxconn is planning 
                                                          
elusive. The average developed country consumer is not likely to be well-informed about 
worker protests or litigation against labor law violations. For examples of worker resistance, 
through wildcat strikes and litigation, see BLANPAIN, supra note 15, at Chapter Eleven. 
 92 James Politi, US Voters Want Tougher China Trade Stance, FIN. TIMES, July 16, 2012, 
at 3 (94% of Americans surveyed worried that jobs were being shipped overseas). 
 93 Alina Tugend, The Workplace Benefits of Being Out of Touch, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2012, at B5; Marjorie Connelly, More Americans Sense a Downside to an Always Plugged-In 
Existence, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, at A12; Elizabeth Holmes, No Vacation from Tweeting, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2012, at D1. 
 94 It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the impact of patent litigation which Apple 
has brought, in the United States and elsewhere, against Samsung, its main competitor in the 
smartphone market. See Evan Ramstad, Samsung Will Fight Efforts To Bar Sales of 
Smartphones, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2012, at B7. In an industry where OEM predominates, 
redistribution of market share among companies is not likely to impact working conditions on 
the factory floor. 
 95 Welcome Home, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2012, at 53. 
 96 Kathrin Hille & Rahul Jacob, Beyond the Conveyor Belt, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, at 9 
 97 Bai Limin, Graduate Unemployment: Dilemmas and Challenges in China’s Move to 
Mass Higher Education, 185 CHINA Q. 128 (2006). 
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eventually to replace workers with robots.98 It is also pursuing a corporate strategy of 
diversification out of OEM manufacturing into higher value-added activity.99 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Despite the uncertainties of proving cause and effect,100 a long-term view of  
history teaches that the more things change, the more they stay the same. The ways 
that employers extract surplus value today have not changed from the era which 
inspired New Deal reforms in the United States: subcontracting, time-shaving, off-
the-clock work, among others.101 That the mechanisms of exploitation do not change 
should make identifying and taking action against them easier. It is a source of 
guarded optimism that the concept of forced labor has moved beyond “traditional” 
forms of chattel slavery and debt bondage, which, though not completely eradicated, 
are greatly diminished.  
Improving the lot of foreign workers may indirectly inure to the benefit of U.S. 
workers, the so-called reverse diffusion of labor norms.102 As a case in point, 
subsequent to all of the negative publicity about its manufacturing activities and 
contemporaneous with an exposé of working conditions in its retail stores,103 Apple 
recently raised the wages of its sales associates in the United States.104 Thus, the 
same extractive approach to labor management which characterizes Apple’s foreign 
OEM manufacturing is manifest in Apple’s domestic sales operations. However, 
wage increases by themselves do not mitigate the effects of overwork, and may in 
fact exacerbate them. An increase in work demands, or "stretch-out," erases the 
benefit of additional wages.105 
A study of one Chinese NGO Yirenping provides clues as to how an organization 
can survive and flourish in an environment otherwise hostile to civil society.106 
                                                          
 98 Kathrin Hille, Foxconn Looks to a Robotic Future, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at 1; Klaus 
Zimmermann, Robots Can Solve China’s Labour Problem, FIN. TIMES, April 17, 2012, at 8.  
 99 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Japanese LCD Alliance Frays, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2012, at 
B4 (Foxconn/Hon Hai investment in Sharp). Local governments in the SEZs now prefer the 
elimination of sweatshops in favor of high-tech industry. See Virginia E. Harper Ho, From 
Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation Under China’s New Labor 
Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 36, 88-89 (2009). 
 100 FRIEDMAN, supra note 60, at 222-23 (hard to demonstrate effectiveness of boycott 
empirically). 
 101 ESTLUND, supra note 10, at 60-64, 110-11, 200-201. 
 102 BLANPAIN, supra note 15, at 860, n. 20. 
 103 Segal, supra note 90 (low wages, working through shifts without rest breaks, no career 
path). 
 104 Ian Sherr, Raises in Store at Apple, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2012, at B3 (biggest staff 
complaint is low wages). 
 105 Intensification of work following a wage increase was a contributing factor to strikes at 
U.S. textile mills in 1929. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 386 
(20th anniversary edition, 1999). 
 106 Fu Hualing, Embedded Socio-Legal Activism in China: The Case of Yirenping, (Univ. 
of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research, Working Paper No. 2012/029), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2096998. 
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Yirenping advocates on behalf of approximately 130 million people in China 
infected with Hepatitis B. Sufferers of the disease experience discrimination in 
employment, which included, at one time, officially sanctioned barriers.  
Yirenping has pursued a diversified approach to its mission, combining online 
networking with offline activism. It brings anti-discrimination cases in court, 
communicates with the public through street theater, and liaises with the media. 
However, to avoid antagonizing the government, its online forum practices self-
censorship to keep the tone of discussion at a moderate level.107 
An important difference between Yirenping and worker rights groups is that the 
former stepped into that rarity, a vacant regulatory space, while the latter present a 
challenge to the single official trade union, the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU). The ACFTU actively discourages grassroots movements. Consequently, 
grassroots movements self-organize, bypass the ACFTU, and take radical collective 
action in the form of work stoppages and street demonstrations.108  
By contrast, Yirenping is careful to avoid the impression of any extremist or 
violent potential.109 The distinctions which Prof. Fu draws between Yirenping and 
grassroots labor movements support the kind of multipronged, multistakeholder 
approach recommended by the CLW Report and this paper. While slow-moving, 
tentative, and uncertain, such an approach seeks to avoid harassment and criminal 
prosecution of individual activist leaders as well as repression of groups which are 
perceived as a threat to governmental authority. 
 
                                                          
 107 Id. at 6. 
 108 Id. at 18-19; BLANPAIN, supra note 15, at 752-63.  Despite Foxconn's ballyhooed 
commitment to allow "genuinely representative" union elections in all of its factories, under 
FLA supervision, the ACFTU will continue to have a monopoly of worker representation. See 
Kathrin Hille & Rahul Jacob, China Wary Amid Push for Workers' Union Poll, FIN. TIMES, 
Feb. 4, 2013, at 3. 
 109 Fu, supra note 106, at 18. 
